Law Of Parties - Randy Halprin

Randy Halprin
 "We tend to see a person in the moment, not as the journey they travelled to get here."  Kat Lehmann

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What is the Law Of Parties?

In the State of Texas, prosecutors take advantage of a law commonly referred to as 'The Law of Parties'. This law was originally designed to entice co-defendants to testify against one another in order to secure convictions. The law cares not whether you participated in the actual crime, whether or not you were aware of what was taking place, or if you offered material support, for example, "entering into a conspiracy to commit an offense" - you are equally culpable. Regardless of whether or not you caused the death of someone, there is no distinction between you and the actual killer in the eyes of the State.

The Texas justice system claims that the death penalty is not only used for the worst of the worst - the most heinous of crimes - but that it is also fair and just. If this is the case, then how can it be called "justice" if a co-defendant in a trial (who may be the actual killer) receives a life sentence, while the person who didn't anticipate or take part in the killing, is given a death sentence under the Law of Parties?  

There are men sitting on Texas death row convicted under this very scenario - Randy Halprin is one of them. He was convicted of Capital Murder and sentenced to death in spite of his own co-defendants' statements that he did not pull a gun, shoot, or take part in the murder. The State also concedes that there is "no physical evidence that points to Halprin as a shooter." Yet, this very law allowed them to sentence him to death for the actions of his co-defendants.

On the night of the Oshman's robbery, Randy could not have anticipated that anyone would be killed, and finding himself in a very alien and unfamiliar situation where guns were being fired, his natural instinct was to flee the scene in fear, causing him to be shot in the foot as he ran.

All of this begs the question: how does sentencing Randy to death deliver any form of justice? The death penalty is something many of us associate with countries who impose severe and inhumane abuses on their citizens, and is an outdated form of justice and punishment that ceased to exist in many countries, decades ago. The Law Of Parties, however, further reduces the Texas justice system to one which does not reflect the common practice of justice within a fair and equal society. It's a law that should worry and concern all citizens because it has the insidious power to condemn a person innocent of capital murder (and/or those whose roles in a crime were minor/minimal) to death, for the actions of others.

As our regular visitors, supporters, and close friends all know, Randy's case took an entirely new turn in May of 2019 and  is currently under review at the trial court. At this time, the Law Of Parties is not the leading factor in Randy's case.

We are naturally concerned about misinformation and the lack of understanding of the Law Of Parties, doing the rounds on social media. We advise anyone involved in Law of Parties cases to understand and be able to distinguish between the two Texas Criminal Codes used in each indictment. The Penal Code below will help you to distinguish between the two. It's very important to know the differences between the two codes so that all information shared or tweeted is 100% accurate to maintain your credibility, and to safeguard the case of the person you are advocating for.

For further information, please contact us on friendsofrandyhalprin.com. Please note that we receive a very high volume of emails every day, and we endeavour to respond to all enquiries within 72 hours.

Thank you!

The Friends of Randy E. Halprin

PENAL CODE

TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 7. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

SUBCHAPTER A COMPLICITY


Sec. 7.01. PARTIES TO OFFENSES

(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.
(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.
(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.02. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER.

(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:
(1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsibile person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;
(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or
(3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.03. DEFENSES EXCLUDED.

In a prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of commission of the offense and that he was a party to its commission, and it is no defense:
(1) that the actor belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or
(2) that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.21. DEFINITIONS

In this subchapter:
(1) "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent," means:
(A) a partner in a parnership;
(B) an officer of a corporation or association;
(C) an agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg, p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.22 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION

(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:
(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto;
(2) by law other than this code in which a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations plainly appears; or
(3) by law other than this code for which strict liability is imposed, unless a legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations plainly appears.
(b) A corporation or association is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if its commission was authorised, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by:
(1) a majority of the governing board acting in behalf of the corporation or association; or
(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec.1, eff. Jan 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.23 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSON FOR CONDUCT IN BEHALF OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION

(a) An individual is criminally responsible for conduct that he performs in the name of or in behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
(b) An agent having primary responsibility for the discharge of a duty to act imposed by law on a corporation or association is criminally responsible for omission to discharge the duty to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly on him.
(c) If an individual is convicted of conduct constituting an offense performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by law for an individual convicted of the offense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.24 DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of a corporation or association under Section 7.22(a)(1) or (a)(2) that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec.1, eff. Jan 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.


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